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ABSTRACT 
 
This article addresses the motivation and constraints of illocutionary meaning production. Within the 
framework of the Lexical Constructional Model (LCM), I explore how our knowledge of illocution is 
understood in terms of high-level situational models which are activated to produce speech act meaning 
and the way such operations motivate the conventionalized value of linguistic expressions. In so doing, I 
analyze the realization procedures of the Aux NP construction in relation to their potential to exploit the 
semantic base of requestive acts. I will study the most conventional linguistic realizations of the 
construction and explore the way in which such realizations are used to produce a requestive meaning. 
The resulting account provides a comprehensive understanding of the constructional nature of 
illocutionary meaning on the basis of naturally occurring data.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The existence of conventional speech acts was first dealt with by Searle (1975) early in 
the development of speech act theory. While pragmaticists have generally neglected the 
conventionalization of illocution (Leech 1983; Sperber and Wilson, 1995, inter alia), 
the systemic-functional approach (Halliday 1994; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004) and 
Dik’s (1989, 1997) functional account have devoted a great effort to formalize the value 
of conventional speech acts. In general terms, functional grammar theories have argued 
for sentence types as codified carriers of basic illocutions, the remaining resulting from 
derivation processes or from the language options. Alternatively, the cognitive linguistic 
approach has accounted for illocution in terms of metonymically grounded inferential 
schemas which become conventionalized through usage (Pérez 2001; Pérez and Ruiz de 
Mendoza 2002; Panther and Thornburg 2003; Stefanowitsch, 2003; Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Baicchi 2007; Brdar-Szabó 2009). Conventional illocutions have been discussed as 
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constructions (i.e. form-meaning pairings, like those described by Lakoff 1987; and 
Goldberg 1995, 2006) that have entrenched speech act values. 
On the grounds of the observations on the constructional nature of speech acts, the 
Lexical Constructional Model (LCM) (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2008, 2011; Mairal 
and Ruiz de Mendoza 2009; Butler 2009) has incorporated illocution as part of a 
meaning construction system. The LCM, which draws insights from functional models 
of language, Cognitive Linguistics and constructionist approaches, especially from the 
work by Goldberg (1995, 2006), is concerned with the connections between syntax and 
all aspects of meaning construction, positing four levels of representation: level 1 deals 
with lexical and constructional argument structure, level 2 with implicated meaning 
captured by low-level models, level 3 with conventionalized illocutionary meaning and 
level 4 with discourse aspects, including cohesion and coherence phenomena. Each of 
the levels is either subsumed into a higher configuration or acts as a cue for the 
activation of relevant conceptual structure that yields an implicit meaning derivation. 
The integration of lower-level structures into higher-level ones is regulated by two 
cognitive processes, constructional subsumption and cued inferencing. Constructional 
subsumption is the constrained incorporation of lower level structures into higher level 
configurations. Cued inferencing is a form of linguistically guided interpretation based 
on cognitive operations such as metaphor, metonymy, reinforcement and mitigation, 
among others. The LCM aims at the highest possible degree of explanatory adequacy, 
insofar as it avoids the proliferation of analytical categories. Instead, it assumes that all 
levels of linguistic description and explanation may make use of the same or at least 
comparable cognitive processes. This assumption is termed the equipollence hypothesis, 
which has enabled the model to achieve a high degree of regularity and parsimony in 
the study of meaning construction. Several linguistic processes have been attested to be 
pervasive in different levels of meaning construction, such as lexical-constructional 
integration, subsumption, metaphor and metonymy and inferential activity. 
The illocutionary component of the LCM treats constructions as form-meaning pairings 
like other kinds of construction. What distinguishes illocutionary constructions from the 
others is the idiomatic nature of the linguistic form and the situational generic 
grounding. Constructions with an illocutionary meaning have also been dealt with at the 
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layer of argument structure, as in the case of the manipulative subjective-transitive 
construction (e.g. I want you out by lunchtime) studied by Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Gonzálvez (2010). Even though the LCM has not provided an inventory of illocutionary 
constructions, its explanatory apparatus is consistent with the descriptions developed by 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007). In their approach, illocutionary constructions are 
discussed in terms of the metonymic activation of high-level scenarios in application of 
a number of socio-cultural conventions stipulated within a description labeled the Cost-
Benefit Cognitive Model. This article develops the illocutionary layer of the LCM by 
analyzing how cognitive models are exploited by speakers to produce speech act 
meaning and the way such operations motivate the conventionalized illocutionary value 
of linguistic expressions. In so doing, it analyzes the cognitive grounding of the Aux NP 
requestive construction and its various realization procedures. On the basis of the LCM 
notion of situational meaning, this work formulates a generic structure for requestive 
acts and examines the reasoning schemas behind the different lexico-grammatical 
resources used for their expression.  
The understanding of illocution in terms of the constructional realizations that activate 
pieces of knowledge makes necessary to provide a refined description of the cognitive 
model types involved and of all the mechanisms that take part in meaning derivation. 
This is not only for the LCM account but also for other cognitively-oriented theories 
where illocutionary expression is considered realizational of semantic structures. This 
will be made apparent by a brief revision of the shortcomings presented by cognitive 
approaches to illocution. Then it will be shown how these shortcomings are overcome 
within the constructionist perspective of the LCM, which has been preliminary outlined 
by Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007). It will be further explained the cognitive 
model types underlying implicit meaning derivation and how the activation of high-
level scenarios yields illocutionary acts which may become conventionalized. The 
analytical tools proposed by the LCM will be used to study the conventional and non-
conventional realizations of the Aux NP construction and the way such realizations 
produce requestive illocutions, giving evidence of their explanatory adequacy. 
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II. THE COGNITION OF ILLOCUTION 
Within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics, Panther and Thornburg (1998: 756) 
have addressed illocution by pointing to the problems that the lack of consideration of 
the cognitive mechanisms has caused in inferential approaches, which are, first, the fact 
that, even though illocutionary interpretation is based on inference, speakers can grasp 
the indirect force of a speech act effortlessly (e.g. the request value of Could you pass 
me the salt?); and second, that they ignore the inference mechanisms involved in the 
interpretation of illocution as well as their cognitive grounding. In order to overcome 
these two shortcomings, Panther and Thornburg (1998, 2004) propose that our 
knowledge of illocutionary meaning is organized in the form of scenarios, which are 
conceptual constructs of meaning representation abstracted away from prototypical 
situations where people attempt to get their needs satisfied through expressions of 
different kinds. Illocutionary scenarios are stored in long-term memory and can be 
accessed metonymically by activating relevant parts in them. For example, indirect 
requests such as Can you open the window?, Will you shut the door? and Do you have 
hot coffee? activate pre-conditions for the performance of a request, which are the 
addressee’s ability and willingness to help, and his possession of the required object. 
The activation of these pre-conditions affords access to the whole speech act category of 
requesting.
1
 
The key elements that make Panther and Thornburg’s proposal interesting from a 
cognitive perspective are storage in long-term memory and metonymic instantiation. 
Their formulation has been revised, however, due to the lack of consideration of socio-
cultural variables that affect inferencing. These variables are listed by Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Baicchi (2007: 103) as the following: (i) the power relationship between speakers, 
(ii) the degree of optionality conveyed, (iii) the degree of politeness, (iv) the degree of 
cost-benefit, (v) the degree of prototypicality, (vi) the semantic motivation of different 
kinds of indirect speech acts, and (vii) the cognitive grounding of illocutions. In Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Baicchi’s proposal, following preliminary work by Pérez and Ruiz de 
Mendoza (2002), socio-cultural variables of this kind are captured by cognitive models 
that combine with scenarios and form what they call high-level situational models. 
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High-level models are constructed on the basis of generalizations over cases of 
everyday interaction where people attempt to satisfy or report their needs. Everyday 
interaction is captured by low-level situational models, which consist in life scenarios 
such as taking a taxi, going to the dentist, teaching a class, and the like (see Ruiz de 
Mendoza, 2007, for a thorough description of cognitive model types). The activation of 
low-level scenarios produces implicated meaning. An example is provided by I waved 
down a taxi, where the waving sign implies that the speaker got into the taxi, he asked 
the driver to take him to the destination, and that he arrived safely. The implicature is 
obtained through the metonymic access to one relevant part of a low-level model about 
taking a taxi. The abstraction over the common structure shared by low-level models 
allows us to construct higher-level representations. For instance, from our observation 
of people begging in a wide range of contexts, we derive generic structure which makes 
up the high-level model of begging and allows us to interpret each specific instance.
2
 In 
contrast to low-level models, high-level models capture a number of socio-cultural 
generalizations that carry different types of pragmatic information like optionality, 
politeness and cost-benefit variables. These variables derive from a single description 
called the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model, which is defined by Ruiz de Mendoza and 
Baicchi (2007) as a high-level model based on the concept of mutual manifestness 
proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1995). The Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model captures the 
relevant socio-cultural information of high-level scenarios associated to illocutionary 
meaning. Let us reproduce Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi’s (2007: 111) formulation of 
the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model in order to explain how it underlies the construing of 
illocutionary meaning: 
(a) If it is manifest to A that a particular state of affairs is not beneficial to B, and if 
A has the capacity to change that state of affairs, then A should do so. 
(b) If it is manifest to A that a potential state of affairs is not beneficial to B, then A 
is not expected to bring it about. 
(c) If it is manifest to A that a potential state of affairs is beneficial to B, then A is 
expected to bring it about provided he has the capacity to do so. 
(d) If it is manifest to A that it is not manifest to B that a potential state of affairs is 
(regarded as) beneficial for A, A is expected to make this manifest to B. 
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(e) If it is manifest to A that it is not manifest to B that a potential state of affairs is 
beneficial for B, A is expected to make this manifest to B. 
(f) If it is manifest to A that a state of affairs is beneficial to B and B has brought it 
about, A should feel pleased about it and make this feeling manifest to B. 
(g) If it is manifest to B that A has changed a state of affairs to B’s benefit, B should 
feel grateful about A’s action and make this feeling manifest to A. 
(h) If it is manifest to A that A has not acted as directed by parts (a), (b), and (c) of 
the ‘cost-benefit’ model, A should feel regretful about this situation and make 
this feeling manifest to B. 
(i) If it is manifest to B that A has not acted as directed by parts (a), (b), and (c) of 
the ‘cost-benefit’ model and A has made his regret manifest to B, B should feel 
forgiveness for A’s inaction and make it manifest to A. 
(j) If it is manifest to A and B that a particular state of affairs is not beneficial to B 
but A has no power to change it to B’s benefit, A should still feel sympathy for 
B over the non-beneficial state of affairs and make this manifest to B. 
(k) If it is manifest to A that A is responsible for a certain state of affairs to be to 
A’s benefit, A may feel proud about this situation and make it manifest to B. 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi place the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model at the core of the 
derivation of illocutionary meaning. In their view, the activation of relevant parts of the 
model creates an inferential path which can become conventionalized. A case in point is 
the Can You VP? sequence for requests, which was originally intended as a way of 
reminding the addressee to help if it was within his range of abilities. This value was 
obtained through the activation of part (c) of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model. This 
convention structures the high-level model of requests and shapes their definitional 
parameters (i.e. optionality and politeness). The repeated use of the Can You VP? 
expression in request contexts conventionalized their meaning to the extent that it ended 
up yielding a default illocutionary value. Conventional forms of this kind have 
constructional status, that is, they are the formal part of form-meaning pairings 
conveying an illocutionary act. By contrast, those expressions which are unable to 
supply relevant points of access to the convention that shapes the conceptual 
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representation of a speech act category require inferential activity to  produce 
illocutionary meaning, which is regulated through metonymic access to high-level 
models, much in the same way as Panther and Thornburg (1998, 2004) have claimed. 
The theoretical implications of constructional conventionalization in terms of the 
application of socio-cultural norms are approached at a later stage in this article. 
 
III. ILLOCUTIONARY CONSTRUCTIONS 
Since Searle (1975) acknowledged that certain linguistic forms became conventionally 
accepted for the performance of an indirect illocutionary force, the research on the issue 
has received a great deal of attention. One of the most important contributions to the 
subject has been carried out by functional grammar theories (Dik 1989, 1997; Halliday 
and Matthiessen 2004), which have been largely criticized for overgrammatizalizing 
illocutionary phenomena which could be accounted for within the domain of pragmatics 
(see Leech 1983: 56; Butler 1996: 66, for criticism in this direction). Nevertheless, 
although the emphasis placed within functional approaches on the grammatical side of 
language lacks of consideration of inferential reasoning, this position has managed to 
incorporate into grammar a number of relevant illocutionary distinctions which had 
been assigned to pragmatics. The development of a constructional approach like the one 
put forward in this study comes closer to the work by other functionalists like Risselada 
(1993), who disagrees with the idea that grammatical mood codifies basic speech act 
types, given the wide variety of illocutionary meanings that each mood option has, and 
rather suggests assigning a certain illocutionary value to each sentence type and 
counting them as reference points. Risselada’s (1993: 74) approach to illocution is 
based on the assumption that the illocutionary force of speech act types is expressed by 
means of combinations of the linguistic properties that reflect the characteristic features 
of the speech act involved. In its most explicit form, an utterance expresses all the 
essential features of a speech act category. Implicit utterances, by contrast, are due to 
pragmatic variables such as power or politeness or to the fact that the shared 
background knowledge provides speakers with the necessary information to derive their 
illocutionary value.
3
 Even though Risselada does not explicitly talk about constructions 
in her account, her proposal covertly points to a constructional view of illocution. Her 
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pairings of formal properties of speech acts with illocutionary meaning cannot be 
regarded otherwise. This theory is in line with cognitively-oriented approaches such as 
the one put forward by Ruiz de Mendoza (1999), later developed in Ruiz de Mendoza 
and Baicchi’s (2007) work. Ruiz de Mendoza’s notion of specialization of function, like 
Risselada’s degree of explicitness, defines the ability of a given expression to activate a 
higher or lower number of meaning conditions of a speech act type.  
Following Risselada’s and Ruiz de Mendoza’s insights and working within Cognitive 
Linguistics, Pérez (2001), puts forward an approach to illocution according to which the 
meaning conditions of speech act categories were paired with the linguistic means 
through (i.e. realization procedures) which they were communicated.
4 
The notion of 
illocutionary construction posited by Pérez refines Risselada’s and Ruiz de Mendoza’s 
work in two aspects. In the first place, Pérez extends the concept to include linguistic 
properties such as sentence type, grammatical resources, lexical elements and 
suprasegmental features. This is quite an advantage, since they serve to increase the 
level of specialization of an expression to convey an illocutionary force. The type of 
illocutionary construction put forward in the present study also captures the array of 
properties proposed by Pérez. The second refinement is that the semantic makeup of 
illocutionary constructions is accounted for in terms of propositional ICMs specifying 
the meaning conditions of a speech act category. In this way, Pérez views constructions 
as pairings of form and function, where form consists in realization procedures capable 
of activating the semantic variables of an ICM. The higher the number of variables that 
are activated by a realization procedure, the more prototypical the realization is for the 
expression of an illocutionary act. However, Pérez does not refer to these realizations as 
constructions with fixed and modifiable elements.  
In contrast to Pérez, Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007) do recognize a constructional 
status for those formulations with instantiation potential for the corresponding scenario. 
As has been explained above, these authors contend that expressions which become 
entrenched as inferential shortcuts acquire a constructional character. The Can You VP? 
construction mentioned before is a case in point. Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi’s 
proposal regards constructions as conventionalized linguistic forms whose capacity to 
activate parts of a scenario becomes conventionalized. Such a conception of the term is 
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similar to the one put forward by Pérez, although differs from the latter in two essential 
aspects. The first difference concerns the semantic structure of the construction, 
structured in the form of cultural high-level models. As has been explained, high-level 
models are conceptual representations of abstract knowledge of illocutionary meaning. 
The formulation of high-level models to account for illocution seeks to capture the 
multi-faced amount of information that speakers possess during communication. Later it 
will be shown that the description of illocutionary acts in terms of high-level models 
attains a greater degree of explanatory adequacy. The second difference has to do with 
the formal composition of illocutionary constructions. Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi 
consider all the realization procedures specified by Pérez (e.g. grammatical resources, 
lexical items, intonation, etc.), with the difference that they are arranged into stable 
structural configurations. A description of illocutionary acts in terms of Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Baicchi’s constructions is very attractive for the following reasons: (i) it 
accounts for the motivation of form from meaning, and (ii) it makes it possible to build 
into grammar a wide range of illocutionary values.  
The LCM elaborates on the view of illocution that has been proposed by Ruiz de 
Mendoza and Baicchi. Illocutionary constructions are conventionalized linguistic forms 
whose capacity to activate parts of a high-level scenario becomes conventionalized. The 
LCM approach, however, refines their account by placing a stronger emphasis on the 
constructional composition of illocution and regard illocutionary constructions as form-
meaning pairings made up of fixed (Can You in Can You VP?) and modifiable (VP in 
Can You VP?) elements. The fixed elements cannot be changed without altering the 
meaning implications conveyed and the variable elements can be parametrized in a 
constrained way. Constructions may also incorporate further elements with a wide range 
of meaning implications (e.g. the adverb please or beneficiary indicators in the case of 
requests). Illocutionary constructions may also have to a degree of variation in their 
form with a consequent variation in their meaning. Sequences like Could You VP? and 
Do You Think You Could VP? are variations of the Can You VP? construction. The 
meaning variation of these constructional variants is associated with degrees of 
indirectness and politeness as well as differences in register. Because of this, the LCM 
accounts for constructions that have elements in common in terms of family 
resemblance relationships (Ruiz de Mendoza and Gonzálvez 2010).
5
 A case in point is 
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the Aux NP construction, which can be realized in many different ways to produce 
requestive speech acts. The constructional realizations of the Aux NP form are analyzed 
to explore their grounding in the conventions of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model and 
the interplay between linguistic structures instantiating requests and their conceptual 
motivation. Throughout the analysis I provide evidence in support of the LCM approach 
to illocution in terms of high-level scenarios and conventional constructions. 
 
IV. REQUESTIVE SPEECH ACTS 
Requestive speech acts ask other people to act in the way we want them to. Requestive 
illocutions ranges over many diverse acts like asking, ordering or begging. Before we 
go into the differences among these values, it should be noted that they are all included 
by Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007) within a broad category of illocutionary acts 
that instruct the addressee to act to the speaker’s benefit. Let us consider the 
conventions of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model that structure the cognitive grounding 
of requestive acts: 
If it is manifest to A that a particular state of affairs is not beneficial to B, and if 
A has the capacity to change that state of affairs, then A should do so. 
If it is manifest to A that a potential state of affairs is not beneficial to B, then A 
is not expected to bring it about. 
Even though requestive illocutions are understood against the same socio-cultural 
background (that we have to satisfy other people’s needs), they are distinct in nature. 
We should first differentiate ordering from requesting and then requesting from 
begging. What distinguishes ordering from requesting has to do with the ratings of the 
power variable. In orders, speakers hold a position of authority over their addressees. 
Because of this authority, the speaker who utters an order works under the expectation 
that the addressee will carry out the action. The addressee’s lack of optionality to decide 
upon the realization of the action triggers off the required response. This is not the case 
with requests, which are performed by speakers who do not have any kind of authority 
over their addressees. However, this does not mean that the addressee’s optionality is 
unconstrained, since his choice is restrained by the conventions that bind him to help the 
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speaker if it is within his range of abilities. The power component that makes orders 
different from requests has led Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi to address these categories 
as distinct illocutions. By contrast, requesting is considered within the same category as 
begging, in spite of presenting important differences. Unlike requests, in begging the 
speaker believes that the addressee is not desirous to give him what he wants and adopts 
a submissive role to obtain the addressee’s compliance. This distinction is manifested 
through different constructional realizations. While requests tend to use mitigators or 
beneficiary indicators, beggings use repetitions and exclamations. Nevertheless, acts of 
requesting and begging display the same cost-benefit ratings and are considered within 
the same category. In keeping with Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi’s account, this study 
of requestive speech acts agrees in differentiating orders from requests based on the 
power variable and also in considering begging as a special form of requesting.  
The present analysis will only consider the illocutionary acts contained within the 
category of requesting. Although the Aux NP form can be found in the performance of 
orders, as will be shown in next section, the meaning conditions of the construction are 
directly tied to the semantics of requesting and needs to be approached in relation to 
requests. To see how the various linguistic realizations of the construction express 
requestive values, it is necessary to define the meaning conditions that make up the 
generic structure of this illocutionary category. Hence I will put forward a high-level 
scenario for requests by generalizing over the features of requesting scenarios grounded 
in the two conventions of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model. We derive the generic 
structure of requests from everyday situations where we attempt to get our needs 
satisfied by other people.
6
 Two possible low-level scenarios for requesting encompass a 
situation in which a person in a needful situation makes somebody else aware of his 
ability to help and a situation in which a person is asking for help while pretending he is 
not in need. These low-level scenarios have elements in common upon which the high-
level scenario may be constructed. This generic structure captures the semantics of the 
act of requesting: 
(a) A person is in need of something. 
(b) The person makes somebody else aware of the need. 
(c) The person makes this other person aware of his ability to help. 
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(d) The person appeals to the addressee’s willingness. 
(e) The addressee may be persuaded to help. 
The realizational resources for this scenario may be exemplified in the following 
utterances: 
(1) I am thirsty. 
(2) Maybe I could have a glass of water. 
(3) Can you give me a glass of water? 
(4) Would you give me a glass of water? 
(5) You will give me a glass of water, won’t you? 
The above realizations instantiate relevant parts of the scenario formulated for requests. 
Utterances (1) and (2) point to the manifestness of the needful situation in which the 
speaker finds himself. Utterances (3) and (4) address the addressee’s ability and 
willingness to satisfy the speaker’s need respectively. These examples are instances of 
the Aux NP construction parametrizing the meaning value with different degrees of 
mitigation. To finish with, utterance (5) spells out that the addressee should be willing 
to help in compliance with socio-cultural conventions. As will be shown in the next 
section, the use of various realization procedures in requests displays peculiarities in 
meaning that reveal different forms of construing a shared conceptual representation. 
 
V. THE AUX NP CONSTRUCTION 
The Aux NP construction is probably the most conventional form for the performance of 
requests. The formal part of this construction consists of an auxiliary plus a second 
person subject and a variable verb. The high-level scenario for requests constitutes the 
semantic base of the construction. This scenario is a manifestation of the conventions of 
the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model according to which speakers should be willing to help 
others if it is within their range of abilities. The requestive meaning of the construction 
was originally derived by means of an inferential schema giving access to these 
conventions, and has become conventionalized through usage. Let us see how this 
meaning value is parametrized through various realization procedures.  
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V.1. The can you realization 
The different realization procedures of the construction are primarily related to the 
auxiliary verb, as the subject pronoun is almost invariable.
7
 The auxiliary is realized by 
a modal verb.
8
 Modal verbs capture the relations between participants and the 
realization of the state of affairs in which they are involved (Dik 1989: 205). They 
include distinctions related to ability and willingness and also to the obligation or 
permission imposed on participants. One of the most recurring modals used is the form 
can, mostly due to the fact that the parameter of the addressee’s ability is relevant to 
requests. In application of the conventions of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model, the can 
you form asks the addressee about his capacity to do something for the speaker. Asking 
the addressee about his capacity to act makes him aware that he is indeed able to carry 
out the action and reminds him that he is culturally bound to act if he has the ability to 
do so. In most contexts, this realization gives easy access to the high-level scenario, 
which is then applied to the specific situation. However, there may be cases where this 
procedure does not fit to be used as a request. By way of illustration, consider the 
following examples:
9
 
(6) Can you see into the future? (Google Books) 
(7) Can you smell the flowers? (Coca) 
(8) Can you drive a truck? (Google Books) 
(9) Can you speak German? (Bnc) 
Utterances above are cases of the construction that function as mere questions.
10 
This is 
due to the parametrization of the variable verb, which needs to be realized by an action-
controlling denoting action involving some kind of benefit to the speaker in order to 
yield a request interpretation.
 
In (6) and (7), the verb denotes a non-controllable activity, 
which is incompatible with the nature of requesting. In (8) and (9), the verb designates a 
controllable action but there is no indication of the potential benefit to be obtained by 
the speaker. These utterances could only be interpreted as requests in marked contexts 
where it is clear that the speaker is interested in getting the action carried out and that 
the performance of the action involves some benefit to the speaker. The fact that the 
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action is beneficial to the speaker is generally made explicit through the use of a 
beneficiary indicator. The instances of the construction featuring this characteristic 
convey an easy request value: 
(10) Can you bring me my purse? (Google Books) 
(11) Can you get me a drink? (Coca) 
(12) Can you write down a recipe for me? (Google Books) 
A similar effect is achieved through the use of mitigating devices, which have the 
function of softening the directive force of the request or of urging the addressee to act 
in the way described: 
(13) Can you please give me a second? (Coca) 
(14) Can you kindly open the door? (Google Books) 
The request interpretation is coded here by the interpersonal adverbs please and kindly, 
whose function is that of increasing the degree of politeness. The mitigation brought 
about by resources of this kind is motivated by the need to soften the impact of the 
request by increasing the degree of the addressee’s optionality. Granting someone with 
optionality is regarded as a sign of politeness in our social system and optionality and 
politeness are thus closely intertwined. Even higher degrees of politeness can be 
achieved through the use of other mitigating strategies, like the replacement of can for 
could. Past modals increase the indirectness of requests, thereby offering the addressee a 
greater degree of optionality to comply with the speaker’s wishes (see Taylor, 1995, and 
Pérez, 2001, for an explanation of the mitigation of past modals in cognitive terms).
11
 
The following examples illustrate this: 
(15) Could you pass me the sugar? (Google Books) 
(16) Could you complete the questionnaire for me? (Google Books) 
Utterances (15) and (16) above display the highest degree of specialization as 
realization procedures for requests. First, because the past form of the modal does not 
only point to the addressee’s ability to carry out the action but also to his willingness by 
giving him optionality. This activates one further variable of the scenario: mitigation. 
Thanks to the mitigating properties of past modal verbs, these two examples manage to 
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make this aspect of requests explicit. And second, because the speaker’s interest in 
getting the action carried out is conveyed through beneficiary indicators (i.e. me and for 
me). The instantiation of these parts of the high-level scenario makes the interpretation 
of these utterances as instances of requesting straightforward. The degree of mitigation 
conveyed by the past form of could can be further increased with the addition of the 
adverb please. There are occasions on which higher degrees of mitigation are required 
in the performance of a request. Consider situations in which the cost of the requested 
action is significant, as in (17), or in which the context of the utterance is formal, as in 
(18): 
(17) Could you please hurry home and watch the children for me? (Google Books) 
(18) Could you please bring me a cup of hot coffee? (Coca) 
The diverse mitigation strategies found in (17) and (18) give rise to subtle formal 
realizations which, by activating a higher number of variables of the scenario, constitute 
even more specialized procedures.  
 
V.2. The will you realization 
Another common way of parametrizing the auxiliary verb of the Aux NP form is 
through the use of the modal will appealing to his willingness to act to the speaker’s 
benefit. Through application of the conventions of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model, 
the addressee should be willing to perform an action to the speaker’s benefit. The will 
you form enquires about the addressee’s willingness to act. In unmarked contexts, this 
realization procedure yields a preferred conventional request interpretation, but it may 
function as a question: 
(19) Will you find true love? (Google Books) 
(20) Will you ever go back to the world of business? (Coca) 
Likewise, this type of realization could be used to perform different speech acts like 
advising and offering. This is so because the modal will is affected in various ways 
depending on the conditions that apply in each particular interaction. The following are 
some examples of such a situation: 
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(21) Will you buy that car? It’s such a beauty. (Coca) 
(22) Will you eat some more cake? (Google Books) 
For this realization procedure to produce a request reading, the specified action has to 
be beneficial for the speaker. This information can be clear from the context or made explicit 
through beneficiary indicators. Its explicitation obviously results in more codified instances of 
requesting. Observe how the manifestness of this part of the high-level scenario increases the 
degree of specialization to the extent that it is not possible to interpret utterances as instances of 
a different speech act:  
(23) Will you lend me money? (Coca) 
(24) Will you buy me a pencil set for Christmas? (Bnc) 
The impact of the resulting request can be mitigated through the use of please. 
This adverb generally indicates that the speaker seeks a benefit from the realization of 
the action, but it may occasionally have the opposite effect. In some cases, the adverb 
may produce forceful demands by implying that the addressee should have acted as 
required without being told to do so. This use of please is reinforced by an imposing 
falling intonation. This type of intonation is often used by people who have some kind 
of authority over their addressees. Compare the different uses of the adverb in (25) and 
(26) below: 
(25) Will you hold the door open for me, please? (Google Books) 
(26) Will you please bring me my back my bag? (Coca) 
As was the case with the previous type of realization, the request meaning can be further 
specified by means of a past form. It has already been explained that the past tense 
displays a mitigation that seems appropriate for the politeness that is expected in the 
performance of requests. By increasing the addressee’s optionality, the use of the form 
would softens the force of the act and points with increasing certainty to a request 
interpretation: 
(27) Would you drive me to the station? (Bnc) 
(28) Would you give me a hand with the washing up? (Google Books) 
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Because of its instantiation potential for the mitigation that is proper of requests, the 
would you sequence represents a highly conventionalized procedure. Needless to say 
that the combination of this type of realization with the adverb please results in even 
more polite and thus adapted instances of requesting as in the following examples: 
(29) Would you please tell me where the library is? (Google Books) 
(30) Would you please pass the steak sauce? (Coca) 
As may become apparent by (29) and (30), the use of these resources increases the 
degree of politeness of this realization that fits best in formal contexts where there is a 
distant relationship between participants. 
 
V.3. Negated modals 
The use of negated modals is another type of realization procedure of the construction 
under scrutiny, although its request meaning is less explicit than in the previous cases. 
The reasoning schema behind this realization affords metonymic access to the parts of 
the scenario where the speaker appeals either to the addressee’s ability or willingness to 
comply, but the negated form of the modal presupposes the addressee’s refusal, which 
gives rise to unmitigated requests marked by their impoliteness. Let us see how this 
meaning is conveyed through the negated form of can in the examples: 
(31) Can’t you behave properly? (Coca) 
(32) Can’t you wipe your feet on the rug? (Google Books) 
Through application of the conventions of the Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model, the 
addressee should have acted as required without being asked to do so. Since in normal 
circumstances, the speaker would expect that the addressee has the ability to act, he 
enquires about any unexpected inability on the part of the addressee to carry out the 
action. In unmarked contexts, this realization procedure has a strong power to activate 
the directive scenario, particularly because it makes explicit the speaker’s expectation 
that the addressee has the ability to perform the action. The request interpretation of the 
construction can be cancelled out uttered in a marked context where the addressee is not 
abided to do anything about the situation described (cf. Can't you hear the whistle 
blowing?).  
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We may find a related realization procedure making use of the negated form of will. In 
this case, the verb used does not assume the addressee’s inability but rather his 
unwillingness to comply with the speaker’s wish. See how this type of realization gives 
rise to a request: 
(33) Won’t you sit quiet? (Coca) 
(34) Won’t you close the window? (Google Books) 
In (33) and (34), the addressee has not carried out the required action counter to 
expectations and the speaker enquires about any unexpected unwillingness on this part. 
This realization procedure produces a request interpretation by reminding the addressee 
that he is abided to act by socio-cultural conventions. The sequence can be nonetheless 
function as a question (cf. Won’t you buy clothes online anymore?) in contexts where 
the addressee is not expected to act. Realizations with negated modals can be performed 
as well by means of the imperative sentence type. Take the case of the following 
examples: 
(35) Calm down, can’t you? (Coca) 
(36) Hurry up, won’t you? (Google Books) 
In contrast to interrogative-based realizations, the use of imperative sentences indicates 
irritation on the part of a speaker who is urging the addressee to act. The resulting 
request is thus more forceful and the optionality of the addressee is notably reduced. 
 
V.4. Conditional forms 
Conditional forms are recognized as a conventional pragmatic mitigator of directive 
values (see Dancygier and Sweetser, 2005 and Fauconnier, 1985, among others). In the 
case of requests, the use of the conditional tense is meant to distance the addressee from 
the required action. This opens up the degree of addressee’s optionality, which reduces 
the force of the act by increasing the indirectness of the request. The most common 
ways of using a conditional in the construction are the following: 
(37) Would you mind if I use your bathroom? (Coca) 
(38) Would you mind handing me that book over there? (Google Books) 
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Utterance (37) is a request for permission. These differ from prototypical cases of 
requesting in that both the speaker and the addressee are expected to perform the action: 
the speaker will carry out the action that the addressee will grant permission. Requests 
for permission are therefore conditional. The action will be carried out only if the 
addressee gives his consent. This conditional character finds an adapted vehicle for 
expression in this realization procedure. This case differs from the one observed in (38). 
Utterance (38) exemplifies a request that makes use of the conditional appealing to the 
addressee’s willingness to comply. In application of the conventions of the Cost-Benefit 
Cognitive Model, we are expected to do our best to help others and, at the same time, 
they expect not to be put to too great an effort in that respect. The conditional form tells 
the addressee that if the carrying out of the action is too costly for him, he can choose 
not to do it. The same realization can be used with the opposite meaning, that is, 
reducing the addressee’s freedom by reminding him he should act as required in 
compliance with the principles of interaction:  
(39) Would you mind not smoking? (Coca) 
In (39), the addressee is treated as if he had not realized that he is acting in a way that is 
negative for the speaker. The conditional form appeals to his willingness to stop the 
negative action in compliance with socio-cultural conventions. The resulting act is 
forceful and impolite. In addition to these conventional realization procedures, there are 
others that accommodate along a prototypical cline. Consider: 
(40) Would you be so kind as to bump up the temperature in here by a degree or two? 
(Coca) 
(41) Would you be so kind as to water my plants while I’m away? (Google Books) 
The previous type of realization mitigated the act of requesting by increasing the 
addressee’s optionality in relation to the cost-benefit variable. The realization procedure 
illustrated in (40) and (41) above, the mitigation is upgraded in relation to the politeness 
parameter. By enquiring about the addressee’s willingness, the speaker is in fact 
reminding the addressee that he is bound by conventions to act if it is within his range 
of abilities. When the required action is presented as seeking a benefit for the speaker, 
the conditional softens the force of the act and functions as a mitigating device. By 
contrast, when the action is presented as an alternative of something negative being 
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done by the addressee, the conditional is used to force the addressee to consider the 
underlying conventions, thereby rendering an impolite act:  
(42) Would you be so kind as to remove your feet from the table? (Google Books) 
In the example, the speaker treats the addressee as if he were not observing the 
conventions of politeness, giving rise to an impolite request that forces the addressee to 
act as required. 
V.5. Summary of realization procedures of the Aux NP construction 
Table 1 below provides a non-exhaustive description of the meaning conditions of the 
high-level scenario for requests and the ways in which they attain linguistic expression 
through the various realizations of the Aux NP construction. 
Table 1. Realization procedures of the Aux NP construction 
Request scenario Realization procedures 
Speaker’s need Beneficiary indicators (for me) 
Speaker’s willingness Conditional forms, beneficiary indicators (for me) 
Addressee’s ability Can you…? Could you…? Can’t you…? 
Addressee’s willingness Will you…? Would you…? Won’t you…? 
Cost-benefit ratings Would you mind…? Would you be so kind…? 
Optionality 
Past modals (could, would), use of please, conditional forms, 
beneficiary indicators (for me) 
Mitigation 
Past modals (could, would), conditional forms, interpersonal 
adverbs (please, kindly), mild intonation and stress 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The present work is a case study of the constructional composition of illocutionary 
meaning within the LCM. The type of illocutionary constructions postulated here pair 
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the semantic makeup of speech acts with the constructional realizations through which 
they are communicated. The formal composition of constructions includes properties 
such as sentence type, grammatical elements, lexical properties and suprasegmental 
features. The meaning conditions defined in the high-level scenario include semantic 
variables and pragmatic features like power, politeness, optionality and cost-benefit 
variables. Such variables are culture-specific and their realization is related to the 
context of situation of each interactional exchange. High-level scenarios provide the 
base of a vast number of illocutionary constructions for a speech act type. The different 
meaning conditions of high-level scenarios are activated through diverse linguistic 
resources, giving rise to constructions with different degrees of codification. The higher 
the degree of codification of a construction, the easier it is to grasp the intended 
meaning and the more specialized the construction is. Conversely, if a construction is 
implicit but still attains important levels of effectiveness by giving access to relevant 
parts of a scenario, it is likely to be conventionalized for a specific illocutionary value. 
The process whereby constructions become conventionalized is constrained by socio-
cultural conventions of the kind postulated within Cost-Benefit Cognitive Model. The 
interpretation of non-conventional constructions requires the use of inference and relies 
on the realization of variable elements and contextual information or shared background 
knowledge. 
This study examines the applicability of the analytical tools put forward by the LCM to 
account for the various realization procedures of the Aux NP construction in relation to 
their potential to activate the semantic base of requesting speech acts. Once described 
the high-level scenario for the category of requesting, I have identified the different 
ways in which the realizations of the Aux NP construction provide the addressee with 
access to the relevant parts of the scenario. The formal composition of the construction 
has proved both realizational of lexico-grammatical devices and conventionally 
associated with them.  
The analysis carried out has provided evidence in support of the LCM approach to 
illocution. However, the results suggest that further research on the subject is still 
needed. It would be advisable to develop the description of the conventions of the Cost-
Benefit Cognitive Model in order to account for the distinctions among the various 
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realization procedures of different requestive acts and also to study the relationship 
between form and meaning among other constructions performing requests.  
 
Notes 
1
 In later work, Panther (2005) has gone further and referred to metonymy as an inference schema rather 
than a substitution relation or a reference point phenomenon, as has been defended by many cognitive 
linguists (Langacker 1993; Kövecses and Radden 1998, inter alia). Specifically, Panther has argued that 
metonymies provide natural inference schemas which are regularly used by speakers in meaning 
interpretation. The role of metonymy as an inference schema has been supported by later research carried 
out by Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007), who identify metonymy at the base of illocutionary 
derivation. The present proposal adheres to such a conception of metonymy in order to account for the 
illocutionary meaning that derives from the activation of scenarios and which later on becomes 
entrenched (in Langacker’s terms, 1999: 105) through a conventionalization process.   
 
2
 In the LCM, interactional knowledge is structured in the form of situational cognitive models, to be 
differentiated from non-situational models. Situational cognitive models capture the interaction among 
entities within a specific time and place. Non-situational cognitive models include variables which are not 
dependent on time and place. Cognitive operations on non-situational models regulate inferred meaning at 
the core grammar level, yielding conversion processes and constructional alternations. Operations like 
metaphor and metonymy on situational models guide pragmatic inferencing (implicature derivation, 
illocutionary meaning and discourse connections). 
 
3
 Risselada’s (1993) definition of explicit and implicit speech acts is equivalent to the traditional 
distinction between codified and inferred speech acts. The degree of explicitness or codification is in both 
cases determined by the number of meaning conditions of the speech act under consideration which are 
instantiated by the linguistic form. 
 
4 
The term realization procedures was first introduced by Ruiz de Mendoza and Otal (1997) to define the 
options offered by the linguistic system for the realization of a communicative strategy. In later work by 
Pérez (2001) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007), this notion is used referring to entrenched lexico-
grammatical devices with instantiation potential with respect to cognitive models. In the present work, 
realizational procedures which have become conventionalized are regarded as constructions in their own 
right. 
 
5 
The notion of family resemblance was originally propounded by Wittgenstein (1978) to make reference 
to those categories whose members do not share a set of common attributes but rather display a network 
of similarities. 
 
6 
For similar descriptions of requesting from a constructionist perspective, see Pérez (1996, 2001) and 
Ruiz de Mendoza and Baicchi (2007). 
 
7 
It is possible, however, to find contexts in which the subject pronoun does not point to the addressee (cf. 
Will he stop making noise?). Instances of this type represent implicit requests to the addressee to get a 
third person to carry out the action. Except for these cases, the realization of the construction involves a 
second person subject (i.e. you). 
 
8 
A useful accounts of modal verbs in terms of force dynamics from a cognitive perspective can be found 
in Talmy (1988).   
 
9 
The description of the realization procedures of the Aux NP construction results from the analysis of a 
corpus of one hundred and sixty-five instances of the construction. The data upon which the study is 
based has been drawn from the original editions of the British National Corpus (BNC), the Corpus of 
Contemporary American English (COCA), WebCorp and Google Books. 
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10 
To resolve the ambiguity of the can you form, the LCM postulates two different constructions. One is 
the polar interrogative construction, which is interpreted as a question about ability and whose 
constituents are realized by can you sequence (e.g. Can you write Morse code?), and another that 
functions as a request, where can you is idiomatic (e.g. Can you bring my glasses?) (see Mairal and Ruiz 
de Mendoza 2009). 
 
11 
Taylor explains the origin of the past tense as a mitigator as a cognitive process involving a double 
metaphorization. There is a first metaphor that structures the time domain in terms of space, as illustrated 
by expressions like near future and distant past, and a second metaphor that structures distance in terms 
of social involvement. Pérez further argues that the distance that triggers the mitigating effect has to be 
established both between the speaker and the speech act and between the intended speech act and the 
actual speech act. 
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